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This paper provides a timely comparative analysis of recent Canadian and European Union (EU) 
copyright cases regarding the nature and scope of communication rights, as applied to the 
issue of copyright liability for hyperlinking. It links these evolving practices with the pertinent 
international law, in particular with the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), together known as the WIPO Internet Treaties. 
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Introduction	  Digital	   technologies,	   online	   communications	   and	   electronic	   commerce	  have	  destabilized	  the	  global	  copyright	  system.	  The	  1996	  WIPO	  Internet	  Treaties	  were	  an	  early	  response	  to	  this	  sea	  change,	  which	  subsequently	  triggered	  a	  wave	  of	  further-­‐reaching	  domestic	   implementation	  actions,	  whose	  higher	   levels	  of	  protection	  were	  often	   tied	   in	   bilateral	   and	   regional	   preferential	   trade	   agreements	   (PTAs),	   in	  particular	  where	  industrialized	  countries	  were	  partners	  to	  the	  deal.	  Building	   on	   textual	   and	   conceptual	   analyses	   of	   the	  WIPO	   Internet	  Treaties,	  we	   undertake	   a	   comparative	   analysis	   of	   judicial	   interpretation	   of	   domestic	  legislation	   that	   implements	   them.	  We	   focus	   on	   one	   specific	   issue	   and	   examine	   in	  some	  detail	  the	  European	  and	  Canadian	  law	  and	  practice	  of	  “making	  available”	  as	  a	  mode	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public,	  in	  particular	  via	  hyperlinking.	  	  Such	   a	   comparison	   is	   interesting	   and	   valuable,	   as	   the	   WIPO	   Treaties	  themselves	   do	   not	   dictate	   any	   particular	   result.	   Rather,	   geopolitical	   compromises	  during	   the	   negotiations	   led	   to	   agreements	   that	   are	   agnostic	   about	   certain	   details,	  deferring	   hard	  questions	   to	  member	   states’	   lawmakers	   tasked	  with	   implementing	  the	   treaty	   provisions.	   Nearly	   a	   dozen	   and	   a	   half	   years	   after	   the	   agreements	  were	  signed,	  this	  article	  asks	  whether	  the	  WIPO	  Internet	  Treaties	  are	  being	  implemented,	  interpreted,	   and	   applied	   in	   domestic	   law	   consistently	   across	   jurisdictions?	   And,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  jurisprudence	  is	  converging	  or	  diverging,	  what	  are	  the	  policy	  implications?	  Although	   early	   cases	   on	   either	   side	   of	   the	   Atlantic	   sometimes	   produced	  complex	  or	  even	  conflicting	  results,	  clearer	  patterns	  are	  emerging.	  For	  one	  example,	  rulings	   in	   Canada	   and	   Europe	   align	   around	   copyright	   liability	   for	   streaming—asynchronous,	   on-­‐demand	   transmissions	   have	   recently	   been	   held	   to	   constitute	  “communication”	  of	  works	   in	  both	   jurisdictions.	  Also,	   in	  both	   jurisdictions,	   similar	  issues	   remain	   unresolved,	   and	   opportunities	   for	   comparative	   lessons	   exist.	  Copyright	  liability	  for	  hyperlinking	  provides	  a	  timely	  illustration.	  Our	   comparative	   findings	   suggest	   that	   preserving	   flexibility	   for	   courts	   to	  interpret	   domestic	   laws	   according	   to	   socio-­‐economic	   conditions,	   technological	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developments,	   and	   local	   priorities	   is	   desirable.	   While	   the	   wish	   for	   certainty	   in	  international	   intellectual	   property	   agreements	   is	   understandable,	   leaving	   the	  resolution	   of	   complex	   or	   controversial	   questions	   to	   domestic	   lawmakers	   is	  sometimes	   a	   preferable	   alternative	   to	   locking	   in	   premature	   or	   ill-­‐conceived	  international	   intellectual	   property	   norms.	   Local	   courts	   are	   better	   able	   to	   adapt	   to	  dynamic	  environments,	  such	  as	  the	  digital	  space,	  than	  international	  diplomats.	  	  Of	  course,	  international	  law	  forms	  an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  context	  in	  which	  courts	   interpret	   and	   apply	   national	   legislation.	   Before	   turning	   to	   the	   specific	   case	  studies	  exploring	  these	  issues	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  WIPO	  Internet	  Treaties’	  making	  available	   provisions,	   a	   look	   at	   the	   origins	   and	   contents	   of	   those	   provisions	   is	  essential—first,	   to	  understand	  their	  basic	  structure	  and	  flexibility,	  and	  second	  and	  perhaps	  more	   importantly,	   to	   contextualize	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	   copyright	   regime	  and	  its	  incessant,	  albeit	  not	  necessarily	  successful,	  struggle	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  digital	  challenge.	  
The	  origins	  of	  “making	  available”	  in	  the	  WIPO	  Internet	  Treaties	  The	   World	   Intellectual	   Property	   Organization	   (WIPO)	   Copyright	   Treaty	  (WCT)1	  and	  the	  WIPO	  Performances	  and	  Phonograms	  Treaty	  (WPPT)2	  (collectively,	  the	  WIPO	  Internet	  Treaties)	  sought	  to	  modernize	  global	  copyright	  law	  and	  make	  it	  fit	   for	   the	   Internet	   Age,	   by	   facilitating	   “adequate	   solutions	   to	   questions	   raised	   by	  new	  economic,	  cultural	  and	  technological	  developments”.3	  Admittedly,	  the	  goal	  was	  fairly	  ambitious,	  especially	  as,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Treaties’	  adoption,	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	   digital	   networked	   space	   were	   largely	   unknown	   and	   policy-­‐makers	   based	   any	  future-­‐oriented	   strategy	   on	   the	   premise	   that	   proprietary	   incentives	   are	   the	   key	  precondition	  for	  creativity	  and	  innovation.4	  There	  was	  little,	  or	  no,	  understanding	  of	  the	   fundamental	   and	   often	   disruptive	   ways	   in	   which	   digital	   technologies	   have	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  WIPO	  Copyright	  Treaty,	  20	  December	  1996,	  WIPO	  Publication	  No.	  226,	  (1997)	  36	  ILM	  65,	  (entered	  into	  force	  6	  March	  2002)	  [WCT].	  2	  WIPO	  Performances	  and	  Phonograms	  Treaty,	  20	  December	  1996,	  WIPO	  Publication	  No.	  227,	  (1997)	  36	  ILM	  76,	  (entered	  into	  force	  20	  May	  2002)	  [WPPT].	  3	  WPPT,	  ibid,	  Preamble;	  WCT,	  supra	  note	  2,	  Preamble.	  4	  WCT,	  supra	  note	  1,	  Preamble	  at	  para	  4.	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changed	   the	   conventional	  modes	  of	   creating,	   distributing,	   accessing,	   using	   and	   re-­‐using	  cultural	  content	  and	  knowledge.5	  The	  constituencies	  behind	  the	  treaty	  change,	  overrepresented	   by	   the	   entertainment	   industries,	   were	   largely	   preoccupied	   with	  other	  implications	  of	  digital	  media,	  such	  as	  the	  ability	  to	  make	  perfect	  copies,	  or	  to	  distribute	  and	  consume	  copyrighted	  content	  without	  the	  limitations	  of	  distance	  and	  space.6	  Despite	  the	  inherent	  utilitarianism	  of	  the	  WIPO	  Internet	  Treaties,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	   that	   the	   parties	   who	   sought	   stronger	   and	   better	   enforceable	   intellectual	  property	   rights	   in	   the	   digital	   space	   only	   partially	   achieved	   their	   goals.7	  Early	  academic	   commentaries	   celebrated	   the	   balance	   between	   private	   and	   public	  interests	   that	   the	   treaties	   enshrined.8	  Some	   of	   these	   voices	   may	   have	   been	   too	  euphoric,	   as	   it	   is	   now	   apparent	   that	   the	   “treaties	   were	   intentionally	   far	   less	  concerned	   with	   enabling	   new	   modes	   of	   creative	   enterprise	   than	   preserving	   the	  existing	   presumptions	   in	   favor	   of	   authorial	   prerogative”9	  and	   that	   “[g]iven	   the	  unrestrained	   versatility	   of	   innovation	   in	   the	   digital	   arena,	   the	   WIPO	   Internet	  Treaties	   have	   fallen	   considerably	   short	   in	   what	   was	   to	   be	   their	   central	   mission,	  namely,	  to	  provide	  a	  relevant	  and	  credible	  source	  of	  norms	  to	  facilitate	  knowledge	  creation	  in	  the	  global	  digital	  context”.10	  With	  the	  benefit	  of	  hindsight,	   it	   is	  also	  evident	   that	  the	   impact	  of	   the	  WIPO	  Internet	   Treaties	   has	   been	   long	   overshadowed	   by	   the	   national	   implementation	  initiatives	   and	   the	  emergence	  of	   further-­‐reaching	   implementation	  models,	   notably	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Yochai	  Benkler,	  The	  Wealth	  of	  Networks:	  How	  Social	  Production	  Transforms	  Markets	  and	  Freedom	  (New	  Haven,	  Ct:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2006);	  James	  Boyle,	  The	  Public	  Domain:	  Enclosing	  the	  
Commons	  of	  the	  Mind	  (New	  Haven,	  Ct:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2008);	  Manuel	  Castells,	  The	  Rise	  of	  
Network	  Society,	  The	  Information	  Age:	  Economy,	  Society	  and	  Culture	  Volume	  1,	  2nd	  ed	  (Malden,	  MA:	  Blackwell	  Publishers,	  2000);	  Manuel	  Castells,	  The	  Power	  of	  Identity,	  The	  Information	  Age:	  Economy,	  
Society	  and	  Culture	  Volume	  2,	  2nd	  ed	  (Malden,	  MA:	  Blackwell	  Publishers,	  2004);	  Manuel	  Castells,	  
End	  of	  Millennium,	  The	  Information	  Age:	  Economy,	  Society	  and	  Culture	  Volume	  3,	  2nd	  ed	  (Malden,	  MA:	  Blackwell	  Publishers,	  2000).	  6	  Ruth	  L	  Okediji,	  “The	  Regulation	  of	  Creativity	  Under	  the	  WIPO	  Internet	  Treaties”	  (2009)	  77:5	  Fordham	  Law	  Review	  2379.	  7	  Ibid.	  8	  See	  e.g.	  John	  Browning,	  “Africa	  1	  Hollywood	  0”,	  Wired	  5:03	  (March	  1997);	  Pamela	  Samuelson,	  “Big	  Media	  Beaten	  Back”,	  Wired	  5:03	  (March	  1997);	  Pamela	  Samuelson,	  “The	  U.S.	  Digital	  Agenda	  at	  WIPO”	  (1996)	  37	  Virginia	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  369.	  9	  Okediji,	  supra	  note	  6	  at	  2381.	  10	  Ibid	  at	  2380.	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that	   of	   the	  Digital	  Millennium	  Copyright	  Act	   (DMCA)	   in	   the	   United	   States	   and	   the	  
Information	   Society	   Directive 11 	  in	   the	   European	   Union,	   which	   have	   also	   been	  replicated	  in	  subsequent	  bilateral	  and	  regional	  preferential	  trade	  agreements.12	  Scholarly	   literature	   has	   covered	   the	   WIPO	   Internet	   Treaties,	   their	  implementation	   and	   overall	   effect	   on	   the	   conditions	   for	   creativity	   in	   the	   digital	  networked	   environment,	   paying	   particular	   attention	   to	   the	   introduction	   of	  technological	   protection	   measures	   (TPMs)	   and	   the	   ban	   on	   circumventing	   such	  measures,	  which	  may	  have	  in	  effect	   limited	  fair	  use	   in	  digital	  media.13	  One	  change,	  however,	   has	   received	   relatively	   less	   academic	   attention—the	   expansion	   of	  copyright	   to	   cover	   merely	   “making	   available”,	   as	   opposed	   to	   copying	   or	  transmitting,	  works	  and	  other	  subject	  matter.	  We	  argue	  that	  this	  expansion	   in	  the	  scope	  and	  exercise	  of	  owners’	  rights	   in	  the	  digital	  space	  has	  crucial	  implications	  for	  the	  sustainability	  of	  that	  space	  itself,14	  and	   is	   therefore	   deserving	   of	   closer	   scrutiny.	   Moreover,	   we	   also	   argue	   that	   it	   is	  essential	   to	   conduct	   not	   only	   textual	   and	   conceptual	   analyses	   of	   these	   treaty	  provisions	  and	  implementing	  domestic	  legislation,	  which	  several	  renowned	  scholars	  have	  already	  done,15	  but	  also	  a	  comparative	  jurisprudential	  analysis	  considering	  the	  treaties’	  practical	  impact	  on	  the	  outcome	  of	  litigated	  cases	  in	  different	  jurisdictions.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  EC,	  Directive	  2001/29/EC	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  22	  May	  2001	  on	  the	  
harmonisation	  of	  certain	  aspects	  of	  copyright	  and	  related	  rights	  in	  the	  information	  society,	  [2001]	  OJ,	  L	  167/10	  [Information	  Society	  Directive].	  12	  See	  e.g.	  Ahmed	  Abdel	  Latif,	  “From	  Consensus	  to	  Controversy:	  The	  WIPO	  Internet	  Treaties	  and	  Lessons	  for	  Intellectual	  Property	  Norm	  Setting	  in	  the	  Digital	  Age”	  in	  Mira	  Burri	  &	  Thomas	  Cottier,	  eds,	  Trade	  Governance	  in	  the	  Digital	  Age	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2012)	  367.	  13	  Peter	  K	  Yu,	  ed,	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Information	  Wealth:	  Issues	  and	  Practices	  in	  the	  Digital	  Age,	  
Volume	  4,	  International	  Intellectual	  Property	  Law	  and	  Policy	  (Westport,	  CT:	  Praeger	  Publishers,	  2007);	  Nicola	  Lucchi,	  Digital	  Media	  &	  Intellectual	  Property:	  Management	  of	  Rights	  and	  Consumer	  
Protection	  in	  a	  Comparative	  Analysis	  (Berlin:	  Springer,	  2006).	  14	  Lawrence	  Lessig,	  Remix:	  Making	  Art	  and	  Commerce	  Thrive	  in	  the	  Hybrid	  Economy	  (New	  York:	  Penguin	  Press,	  2008);	  Jonathan	  L	  Zittrain,	  The	  Future	  of	  the	  Internet	  and	  How	  to	  Stop	  It	  (New	  Haven,	  Ct:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2008);	  Ian	  Brown	  &	  Christopher	  T	  Marsden,	  Regulating	  Code:	  Good	  
Governance	  and	  Better	  Regulation	  in	  the	  Information	  Age	  (Cambridge,	  Mass:	  MIT	  Press,	  2013).	  15	  See	  e.g.	  Mihály	  Ficsor,	  The	  Law	  of	  Copyright	  and	  the	  Internet:	  The	  1996	  WIPO	  Treaties,	  their	  
Interpretation	  and	  Implementation	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2002);	  Jörg	  Reinbothe	  &	  Silke	  von	  Lewinski,	  The	  WIPO	  Treaties	  1996:	  The	  WIPO	  Copyright	  Treaty	  and	  The	  WIPO	  
Performances	  and	  Phonograms	  Treaty,	  Commentary	  and	  Legal	  Analysis	  (London:	  Butterworths	  LexisNexis,	  2002);	  Simon	  Fitzpatrick,	  "Copyright	  Imbalance:	  US	  and	  Australian	  Responses	  to	  the	  WIPO	  Digital	  Copyright	  Treaty",	  (2002)	  22	  EIPR	  214;	  Jane	  C	  Ginsburg,	  “The	  (New?)	  Right	  of	  Making	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Making	  available	  is	  mentioned	  in	  two	  different	  articles	  of	  the	  WCT.	  Article	  8	  of	  the	  WCT	  states:	  
Article	  8	  
Right	  of	  Communication	  to	  the	  Public	  Without	   prejudice	   to	   the	   provisions	   of	   Articles	   11(1)(ii),	   11bis(1)(i)	  and	   (ii),	  11ter(1)(ii),	  14(1)(ii)	  and	  14bis(1)	  of	   the	  Berne	  Convention,	  authors	  of	  literary	  and	  artistic	  works	  shall	  enjoy	  the	  exclusive	  right	  of	  authorizing	  any	  communication	   to	   the	  public	  of	   their	  works,	  by	  wire	  or	  wireless	  means,	  including	  the	  making	  available	  to	  the	  public	  of	  their	  works	   in	   such	   a	   way	   that	   members	   of	   the	   public	   may	   access	   these	  works	  from	  a	  place	  and	  at	  a	  time	  individually	  chosen	  by	  them.	  	  Also,	  Article	  6	  of	  the	  WCT	  states:	  
Article	  6	  
Right	  of	  Distribution	  (1)	   Authors	   of	   literary	   and	   artistic	   works	   shall	   enjoy	   the	   exclusive	  right	  of	  authorizing	  the	  making	  available	  to	  the	  public	  of	   the	  original	  and	  copies	  of	  their	  works	  through	  sale	  or	  other	  transfer	  of	  ownership.	  	  The	   agreed	   statements	   accompanying	   Article	   6	   clarify	   that	   it	   applies,	   at	   a	  minimum,	   to	   copies	   that	   can	   be	   circulated	   as	   tangible	   objects.	   However,	   nothing	  prevents	  countries	  from	  applying	  the	  right	  of	  distribution	  also	  to	  intangible	  copies,	  as	  an	  additional	  and/or	  alternative	  means	  of	  providing	  authors	  the	  exclusive	  right	  to	  authorize	  the	  making	  available	  of	  works.16	  The	  WPPT	  provides	  similar	  protection	  to	  performers	  and	  record	  makers,	   in	  Articles	   10	   and	   14	   respectively,	   under	   a	   different	   heading,	   “Right	   of	   Making	  Available…”:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Available	  to	  the	  Public”	  in	  David	  Vaver	  &	  Lionel	  Bentley,	  eds,	  Intellectual	  Property	  in	  the	  New	  
Millennium:	  Essays	  in	  Honour	  of	  William	  R	  Cornish	  (Cambridge,	  UK:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2004)	  234;	  Andrew	  Christie	  &	  Eloise	  Dias,	  “The	  New	  Right	  of	  Communication	  in	  Australia”	  (2005)	  27	  Sydney	  Law	  Review	  237	  [Christie	  &	  Dias	  "New	  Right"];	  David	  Fewer,	  “Making	  Available:	  Existential	  Inquiries”	  in	  Michael	  Geist,	  ed,	  In	  the	  Public	  Interest:	  The	  Future	  of	  Canadian	  Copyright	  
Law	  (Toronto:	  Irwin	  Law,	  2005)	  267;	  David	  O	  Carson,	  “Making	  the	  Making	  Available	  Right	  Available”	  (2010)	  33	  Columbia	  Journal	  of	  Law	  &	  the	  Arts	  135.	  16	  	  Ficsor,	  ibid	  at	  499-­‐500.	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Article	  10/14	  
Right	  of	  Making	  Available	  of	  Fixed	  Performances/Phonograms	  Performers/Producers	  of	  phonograms	   shall	   enjoy	   the	  exclusive	   right	  of	  authorizing	  the	  making	  available	  to	  the	  public	  of	  their	  performances	  fixed	  in	  phonograms/phonograms,	  by	  wire	  or	  wireless	  means,	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  members	  of	  the	  public	  may	  access	  them	  from	  a	  place	  and	  at	  a	  time	  individually	  chosen	  by	  them.	  	  A	   key	   point	   about	   these	   provisions	   is	   that	   the	   particular	   headings	   under	  which	  the	  treaties	  reference	  making	  available	  are	  not	   important.	  The	  placement	  of	  making	  available	  in	  Article	  8	  of	  WCT,	  under	  the	  title	  “Right	  of	  Communication	  to	  the	  Public”,	  does	  not	  require	  countries	  to	  implement	  protection	  only	  or	  at	  least	  through	  this	   particular	   right.	   Nor	   does	   Article	   6	   require	   signatories	   to	   only	   or	   at	   least	  address	  making	  available	  through	  the	  distribution	  right.	  And	  nor	  does	  the	  inclusion	  of	   performers’	   and	   makers’	   parallel	   rights	   in	   Articles	   10	   and	   14	   of	   WPPT,	   titled	  “Right	  of	  Making	  Available	  …”,	  require	  countries	  to	  enact	  sui	  generis	  protection	  for	  a	  new	   right.	   Rather,	   signatories	   may	   protect	   making	   available	   in	   some	   instances	  through	   the	   distribution	   right,	   and	   in	   other	   instances	   through	   the	   communication	  right,	  and	  in	  other	  instances	  through	  a	  combination	  of	  existing	  or	  sui	  generis	  rights.	  It	  is	  important	  that	  countries	  protect	  making	  available,	  not	  how	  specifically	  they	  do	  so.	   The	   treaties’	   flexible	   approach	   to	   making	   available,	   capable	   of	   different	  domestic	   implementations	   via	   various	   new	   or	   existing	   rights	   or	   combinations	   of	  rights,	   is	   known	   as	   the	   “umbrella	   solution”.	   Under	   the	   umbrella	   solution,	   how	   a	  country	   might	   address	   making	   available	   may	   depend	   upon	   different	   factors,	  including	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  use	  of	  the	  work	  made	  by	  a	  member	  of	  the	  public.	  17	  	  This	  freedom	  of	  legal	  classification	  is	  the	  constructive	  ambiguity	  preserved	  in	  order	  to	  facilitate	  an	  agreement	  between	  jurisdictions	  with	  different	  conceptions	  of	  the	  bundle	  of	  rights	  that	  constitute	  copyright.	  Countries	  implementing	  the	  umbrella	  solution	  reflected	  in	  the	  WIPO	  Internet	  Treaties	  may	  choose	  to	  characterize	  making	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Ibid	  at	  499.	  
de	  Beer	  &	  Burri	  
	   8	  
available	  as	  an	  authorization,	  communication,	  distribution,	  reproduction,	  sui	  generis	  activity,	  or	  some	  combination	  of	  those	  possibilities.	  In	   the	   United	   States,	   no	   legislative	   changes	   were	   perceived	   necessary	   to	  implement	   the	  making	  available	  provisions.	  Although	  US	   law	   is	  not	  a	   focus	  of	   this	  particular	   article,	   the	   fact	   that	   this	   approach	   has	   led	   to	   some	   confusion	   and	  conflicting	  opinions	  about,	  for	  example,	  whether	  merely	  uploading	  files	  to	  a	  peer-­‐to-­‐peer	  network	  constitutes	  copyright	  infringement,	  18	  demonstrates	  the	  crucial	  role	  of	  judicial	  interpretation	  in	  giving	  practical	  effect	  to	  the	  WIPO	  Internet	  Treaties.	  	  The	  European	  Union	  has	  implemented	  the	  making	  available	  provisions	  of	  the	  WIPO	   Internet	   Treaties	   via	   the	   Information	   Society	   Directive.19	  Article	   3	   of	   that	  Directive	  reads	  as	  follows:	  
Article	  3	  
Right	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public	  of	  works	  and	  right	  of	  
making	  available	  to	  the	  public	  other	  subject-­‐matter	  1.	   Member	   States	   shall	   provide	   authors	   with	   the	   exclusive	   right	   to	  authorise	  or	  prohibit	  any	  communication	  to	  the	  public	  of	  their	  works,	  by	   wire	   or	   wireless	   means,	   including	   the	   making	   available	   to	   the	  public	  of	   their	  works	   in	   such	  a	  way	   that	  members	  of	   the	  public	  may	  access	  them	  from	  a	  place	  and	  at	  a	  time	  individually	  chosen	  by	  them.	  2.	  Member	  States	  shall	  provide	  for	  the	  exclusive	  right	  to	  authorise	  or	  prohibit	  the	  making	  available	  to	  the	  public,	  by	  wire	  or	  wireless	  means,	  in	   such	   a	   way	   that	   members	   of	   the	   public	   may	   access	   them	   from	   a	  place	  and	  at	  a	  time	  individually	  chosen	  by	  them:	  (a)	  for	  performers,	  of	  fixations	  of	  their	  performances;	  (b)	  for	  phonogram	  producers,	  of	  their	  phonograms;	  (c)	  for	  the	  producers	  of	  the	  first	  fixations	  of	  films,	  of	  the	  original	  and	  copies	  of	  their	  films;	  (d)	   for	   broadcasting	   organisations,	   of	   fixations	   of	   their	   broadcasts,	  whether	   these	   broadcasts	   are	   transmitted	   by	   wire	   or	   over	   the	   air,	  including	  by	  cable	  or	  satellite.	  	  The	  Canadian	  treatment	  of	  making	  available	  is,	  we	  argue	  below,	  apparently	  a	  hybrid	  between	   the	  European	  and	  American	  approaches.	  Canada	  has	   amended	   its	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  See	  generally	  Peter	  S.	  Menell,	  In	  Search	  of	  Copyright’s	  Lost	  Ark:	  Interpreting	  the	  Right	  to	  Distribute	  
in	  the	  Internet	  Age,	  59	  J.	  Copyright	  Soc’y	  U.S.A.	  1	  (2011).	  	  19	  Information	  Society	  Directive,	  supra	  note	  11.	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Copyright	   Act	   to	   add	   the	   following	   provision	   to	   the	   preexisting	   definition	   of	  	  	  communication:	  
Communication	  to	  the	  public	  by	  telecommunication	  (1.1)	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	   this	  Act,	  communication	  of	  a	  work	  or	  other	  subject-­‐matter	  to	  the	  public	  by	  telecommunication	  includes	  making	  it	  available	   to	   the	   public	   by	   telecommunication	   in	   a	  way	   that	   allows	   a	  member	  of	   the	  public	   to	  have	  access	   to	   it	   from	  a	  place	  and	  at	  a	   time	  individually	  chosen	  by	  that	  member	  of	  the	  public.	  	  Recent	  Supreme	  Court	  jurisprudence,	  however,	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  a	  legal	  distinction	   between	  making	   available	   for	  communication	   and	  making	   available	   for	  
reproduction/distribution.	  Both	  activities	  attract	   liability,	  but	   likely	  under	  different	  rights.	  As	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  arguably,	  no	  legislative	  amendment	  was	  necessary	  to	  protect	   making	   available	   for	   reproduction/distribution,	   i.e.	  downloading,	   because	  Canadian	   law	   already	   covered	   that	   activity	   through	   a	   combination	   of	   rights	   other	  than	   the	   communication	   right.	   Statutory	   reforms	   clarified,	   in	   case	   there	   was	  previously	   doubt,	   that	   the	   communication	   right	   includes	   making	   available	   for	  activities	  such	  as	  streaming.	  These	  differing	  approaches	  demonstrate	  a	  central	  thesis	  of	  this	  article—that	  interpreting	   the	   treaty	  provisions	  alone	   is	   insufficient	   to	  understand	  and	  compare	  their	   practical	   impact	   across	   jurisdictions.	   The	   next	   section	   of	   the	   article	   engages	  more	  deeply	  in	  comparative	  jurisprudential	  analyses	  of	  making	  available	  in	  Canada	  and	  the	  European	  Union.	  
Implementing	  and	  Applying	  Making	  Available	  in	  Canada	  In	  July	  of	  2012,	  a	  quintet	  of	  decisions	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada	  shook	  the	   foundations	   of	   copyright.20	  Among	   other	   things,	   these	   cases	   fundamentally	  altered	  understandings	  of	  the	  conceptual	  structure	  of	  copyright	  as	  an	  indeterminate	  bundle	   of	   rights.	   In	   Canada,	   copyright	   boils	   down	   to	   rights	   of	   reproduction,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Michael	  Geist,	  ed,	  The	  Copyright	  Pentalogy:	  How	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada	  Shook	  the	  
Foundations	  of	  Canadian	  Copyright	  Law	  (Ottawa:	  University	  of	  Ottawa	  Press,	  2013).	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performance,	   and	  publication.	  That	   taxonomy	  encompasses	  other	   rights	   as	   simply	  illustrative	  of	  these	  essential	  activities.	  Major	  legislative	  revisions	  to	  Canada’s	  copyright	  statute	  must	  be	  interpreted	  in	   that	   context.	   In	   November	   of	   2012,	   the	   Copyright	  Modernization	   Act	   amended	  Canada’s	  Copyright	  Act.21	  The	  bill	  added,	  among	  many	  other	   things,	  a	  clause	   to	   the	  definition	   of	   “communication	   to	   the	   public	   by	   telecommunication”	   to	   clarify	   that	  communication	  of	   a	  work	  or	  other	   subject-­‐matter	   “includes	  making	   it	   available	   to	  the	   public	   by	   telecommunication	   in	   a	  way	   that	   allows	   a	  member	   of	   the	   public	   to	  have	  access	  to	  it	  from	  a	  place	  and	  at	  a	  time	  individually	  chosen	  by	  that	  member	  of	  the	  public.”22	  	  These	  developments,	  in	  combination,	  could	  have	  profound	  implications	  on	  a	  variety	  of	   legal	   and	  economic	   issues	  arising	  due	   to	   technological,	   commercial,	   and	  social	  innovations	  in	  the	  creation	  and	  distribution	  of	  digital	  content.	  One	  of	  the	  hot-­‐button	  issues	  will	  be	  copyright	  liability	  for	  hyperlinking—the	  same	  issue	  that	  is	  the	  subject	   of	   a	   current	   dispute	   before	   the	   CJEU	   concerning	   related	   provisions	   of	   the	  EU’s	  Information	  Society	  Directive.23	  Before	  outlining	  how	  Canadian	  law	  on	  that	  issue	  may	  evolve	  and	  comparing	  the	  EU	  approach,	  this	  paper	  briefly	  explains	  relevant	  recent	  decisions	  and	  pending	  cases.	  Key	  Supreme	  Court	  cases	  include	  SOCAN	  v	  Entertainment	  Software	  Association	  
of	  Canada	  (ESA)24	  and	  Crookes	  v	  Newton.25	  The	  first	  of	  the	  cases	  just	  mentioned,	  ESA,	  was	   part	   of	   the	   2012	   copyright	   quintet,	  while	  Crookes	  was	   a	   defamation	   decision	  issued	   the	   previous	   year.	   Combined	   with	   several	   on-­‐going	   appellate-­‐court	   and	  administrative	  proceedings,	   these	   cases	   could	  determine	  whether	  and,	   if	   so,	  when	  hyperlinking	  might	  constitute	  copyright	  infringement	  in	  Canada.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Copyright	  Act,	  RSC	  1985,	  c	  C-­‐42.	  22	  Ibid,	  s	  2.4(1.1).	  23	  Information	  Society	  Directive,	  supra	  note	  11.	  24	  Entertainment	  Software	  Association	  v	  Society	  of	  Composers,	  Authors	  and	  Music	  Publishers	  of	  Canada,	  2012	  SCC	  34,	  [2012]	  2	  SCR	  231[ESA].	  The	  author,	  Jeremy	  de	  Beer,	  discloses	  that	  he	  acted	  as	  co-­‐counsel	  for	  the	  intervenor,	  Canadian	  Internet	  Policy	  and	  Public	  Interest	  Clinic,	  in	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada.	  25	  Crookes	  v	  Newton,	  2011	  SCC	  47,	  [2011]	  3	  SCR	  269	  [Crookes].	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ESA	   stemmed	   from	   a	   very	   drawn	   out	   administrative	   procedure	   before	   the	  Copyright	   Board	   of	   Canada	   to	   certify	   a	   tariff,	   proposed	   by	   the	   collective	   society	  representing	   composers	   and	   music	   publishers	   (called	   “SOCAN”),	   for	   the	  communication	   of	  musical	  works	   via	   the	   Internet.	   The	   tariff,	   substantially	   revised	  since	   it	   was	   first	   proposed	   in	   1996,	   has	   twice	   wound	   through	   appeals	   up	   to	   the	  country’s	   highest	   court,	   and	   still	   is	   not	   settled.	   The	   latest	   episode	   in	   the	   Supreme	  Court	  concerned	  copyright	  liability	  for	  streaming	  and/or	  downloading	  online	  music.	  In	  particular,	   online	  music	   service	  providers	   argued	   that	  while	   streaming	   triggers	  royalty	  obligations	  similar	  to	  conventional	  radio	  and	  television	  broadcasting,	  digital	  downloads	  are	  more	   like	  selling	  physical	  records,	  and	  should	  not	   therefore	  attract	  additional	  copyright	  liability	  for	  the	  communication	  as	  well	  as	  the	  distribution.	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  agreed.	  For	   several	   decades	   until	   2012,	   licensing	   practices	   in	   the	   Canadian	   digital	  music	  market	  were	  based	  on	   the	  premise	   that	  online	  music	  distribution	   triggered	  overlapping	   liability	   to	  both	   reproduction	  and	  communication	   rights	  holders.	  This	  belief	   was	   based	   on	   earlier	   case	   law26 	  that	   had	   suggested	   reproduction	   and	  communication	  rights	  were	  “separate	  and	  distinct”	  parts	  of	  a	  bundle	  of	  copyrights.	  Overruling,	  or	  rather,	  re-­‐explaining	  previous	  cases,	   the	  Supreme	  Court	  held	   in	  ESA	  that	   “Internet	   delivery	   of	   copies”	   constitutes	   a	   single	   act,	   which	   could	   implicate	  either	  but	  not	  both	  separate	  and	  distinct	  reproduction	  and	  communication	  rights.27	  	  The	   ESA	   decision	   had	   two	   immediate	   effects.	   First,	   companies	   that	   had	  already	  paid	  royalties	  for	  the	  digital	  distribution	  of	  copies	  of	  music,	  such	  as	  ringtone	  downloads,	  sued	  to	  recover	   these	  amounts.28	  Second,	   the	  Copyright	  Board	  decided	  there	   was	   no	   basis	   for	   SOCAN’s	   proposed	   tariff	   on	   companies	   that	   sell	   “durable”	  copies,	   i.e.	   downloads.	   Communication	   royalties	   are	   only	   payable	   to	   SOCAN	   for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Bishop	  v	  Stevens,	  [1990]	  2	  SCR	  467,	  72	  DLR	  (4th)	  97	  [Bishops].	  27	  Jeremy	  de	  Beer,	  “Copyright	  Royalty	  Stacking”	  in	  Geist,	  supra	  note	  24,	  335	  at	  350	  [de	  Beer,	  "Royalty	  Stacking"].	  28	  That	  case	  is	  now	  pending	  in	  federal	  court:	  Plaintiff’s	  Statement	  of	  Claim	  in	  Rogers	  Communications	  
Partnership	  et	  al	  v	  SOCAN,	  Federal	  Court	  File	  No.	  T-­‐2046-­‐12,	  (November	  13,	  2012),	  <http://www.scribd.com/doc/113244090/rogers-­‐et-­‐al-­‐v-­‐socan-­‐claim-­‐or-­‐return-­‐of-­‐ringtone-­‐payments>.	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streaming,	  by	  services	  such	  as	  Rdio	  or	  Spotify.	  For	  selling	  downloads,	  digital	  music	  retailers	  must	  only	  pay	  reproduction	  royalties,	  to	  a	  different	  collective	  society.	  That,	  however,	  is	  not	  nearly	  the	  end	  of	  the	  matter.	  The	  scope	  and	  meaning	  of	  the	   addition	   of	   “making	   available”	   in	   section	   2.4(1.1)	   via	   the	   Copyright	  
Modernization	  Act	   is	   now	   an	   issue	   in	   a	   proceeding	   before	   the	   Copyright	   Board.29	  SOCAN	  argues	  that	  statutory	  reforms	  override	  the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  recent	  rulings,	  by	   defining	   “communication”	   to	   include	   “making	   available”	   for	   any	   unspecified	  purpose.	   Online	   music	   providers	   advance	   the	   contrary	   position	   that	   the	   right	   to	  communicate	   to	   the	  public	  by	   telecommunication	   includes	   the	  making	  available	  of	  works	   for	   access	   only	  by	   streaming,	   and	  does	  not	   include	   the	  making	   available	   of	  works	  for	  access	  by	  downloading.	  Based	  on	  the	  latter	  interpretation	  of	  Canadian	  copyright	  law,	  a	  work	  or	  other	  subject	  matter	   is	  made	   available	  when	   the	  work	   or	   the	   object	   of	   related	   rights	   is	  uploaded	   for	   interactive	   access	   irrespective	   of	   what	   kind	   of	   interactive	   use	  (streaming	   or	   downloading)	   is	   made	   possible.	   The	   fundamental	   character	   of	   the	  interactive	  use	  determines	  not	  whether	  the	  person	  who	  made	  the	  work	  available	  is	  liable	   to	   pay	   royalties,	   but	   rather	   to	   whom	   the	   person	   is	   liable	   to	   pay	   royalties	  pursuant	   to	   which	   right.	   If	   the	   work	   or	   subject	   matter	   is	   made	   available	   for	  downloading,	   the	   person	   making	   it	   available	   might	   be	   liable	   for	   reproducing,	  distributing	   or	   authorizing	   the	   reproduction	   or	   distribution.	   If	   the	   work	   or	   other	  subject	   matter	   is	   made	   available	   for	   streaming,	   the	   person	   might	   be	   liable	   for	  communication.	  As	   implemented	   in	  Canada,	  making	  available	   is	  not	  a	  new	  “right”	  at	  all,	  but	  rather	   a	   definitional	   clarification	   of	   the	   existing	   communication	   right.	   In	   context,	  being	   part	   of	   the	   definition	   of	   communication	   arguably	   limits	   the	   scope	   of	   this	  particular	  definitional	  provision	  to	  making	  available	  for	  communication,	  not	  making	  available	  for	  the	  distribution	  of	  copies.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  The	  author,	  Jeremy	  de	  Beer,	  discloses	  that	  he	  provided	  expert	  opinion	  in	  this	  proceeding	  on	  behalf	  of	  several	  online	  music	  service	  providers.	  That	  opinion	  reflects	  parts	  of	  the	  text	  in	  this	  section	  of	  the	  paper.	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If	   making	   available	   for	   downloading	   were	   considered	   a	   communication,	  owners	  of	   reproduction	  or	  distribution	   rights	  would	  have	  no	  enforceable	   claim	   to	  payment.	   Although	   voluntary	   arrangements	   may	   exist	   to	   share	   royalties	   among	  collective	   societies	   administering	   communication	   and	   reproduction	   rights,	   relying	  on	  voluntary	  royalty-­‐sharing	  agreements	  among	  collectives	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  obligations	  to	  provide	  exclusive	  rights	  pursuant	  to	  the	  WIPO	  Internet	  Treaties.	  The	  treaties	   require	   that	   reproduction	   rights	   holders	   be	   given	   greater	   protection	   than	  would	   be	   provided	   only	   secondarily	   via	   the	   distribution	   of	   royalties	   collected	   by	  performing	  rights	  societies.	  That	  is	  because,	  based	  on	  Supreme	  Court	  jurisprudence,	  the	   single	   act	   of	   making	   a	   work	   or	   other	   subject	   matter	   available	   is	   not	   both	   a	  communication	  and	  reproduction	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  In	   light	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Court’s	   decision	   in	   ESA	   v	   SOCAN,	   the	   act	   of	  transmitting	   a	   work	   via	   the	   Internet	   probably	   does	   not	   infringe	   both	   the	  communication	   and	   reproduction	   rights.30	  Whether	   the	   act	   of	   making	   available	  implicates	   the	   communication	   or	   reproduction	   right	   depends	   on	   the	   fundamental	  character	  of	  the	  intended	  interactive	  use,	  such	  as	  streaming	  or	  downloading.	  Making	  available	   for	   streaming	   would	   implicate	   communication;	   making	   available	   for	  downloading	  would	  implicate	  other	  rights	  including	  reproduction,	  distribution,	  and	  authorization.31	  While	  the	  pending	  cases	  before	  the	  Copyright	  Board	  do	  not	  yet	  raise	  the	  issue	  of	   “making	   available”	   liability	   for	   hyperlinking,	   given	   the	   litigious	   realities	   of	  copyright	  tariff-­‐setting	  procedures	  in	  Canada,	  that	  question	  will	  almost	  surely	  arise	  very	   soon.	   In	   fact,	   at	   least	   one	   collective	   society	   representing	   book	   publishers	   is	  already	  purporting	   to	   license	  linking	  by	  educational	   institutions	  and	  other	  users	  of	  published	  literary	  works.32	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  ESA,	  supra	  note	  24.	  	  31	  These	  requirements	  are	  also	  consistent	  with	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada	  in	  Rogers	  
Communications	  Inc	  v	  Society	  of	  Composers,	  Authors	  and	  Music	  Publishers	  of	  Canada,	  2012	  SCC	  35,	  [2012]	  2	  SCR	  283	  [Rogers	  v	  SOCAN].	  32	  For	  commentary	  on	  this	  controversial	  licensing	  practice,	  see	  Michael	  Geist,	  “Something	  for	  Nothing:	  The	  Non-­‐Existent	  Benefit	  of	  Linking	  in	  the	  Access	  Copyright	  Deal”	  (4	  May	  2012),	  online:	  <http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/6458/125/>;	  Sam	  Trosow,	  “Once	  Again:	  Linking	  is	  Not	  Unauthorized	  Copying,”	  (25	  June	  2012),	  online:	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This	  was	  also	  a	  live	  issue	  in	  a	  Canadian	  case	  soon	  to	  be	  heard	  by	  the	  Federal	  Court	  of	  Appeal,	  Warman	  v.	  Fournier,33	  in	  which	  the	  trial	  division	  held	  that	  linking	  to	  a	   photograph	   did	   not	   constitute	   copyright	   infringement,	   because	   the	   photograph	  had	  already	  been	  published	  with	  the	  approval	  of	  the	  copyright	  owner.	  That	  is,	  even	  if	  hyperlinking	  did	  constitute	  communication	  to	  the	  public	  (which	  the	  trial	  judge	  did	  not	   rule	   on),	   this	   hyperlink	   was	   not	   an	   infringement	   of	   copyright	   because	   any	  communication	   was	   not	   an	   unauthorized	   communication;	   it	   was	   made	   with	   the	  implied	  authorization	  of	  the	  copyright	  owner	  who	  put	  the	  content	  online	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Accessibility	  of	  the	  work	  always	  “was	  within	  the	  applicant’s	  full	  control	  and	  if	  he	  did	  not	  wish	   it	   to	  be	   communicated	  by	   telecommunication,	   he	   could	   remove	   it	  from	  his	  website,	  as	  he	  eventually	  did.”34	  The	   broader	   question	   of	   whether	   –	   in	   light	   of	   statutory	   reforms	   –	   linking	  constitutes	   “communication	  by	  making	  available”	   can	  be	  assessed,	   first,	   in	   light	  of	  the	  general	  policy	  and	  practical	  considerations	  that	  underpin	  recent	  Supreme	  Court	  jurisprudence,	  including	  balance,	  efficiency	  and	  neutrality.	  The	  same	  principles	  that	  justify	   reducing	   copyright	   royalty	   stacking	   also	   justify	   not	   imposing	   copyright	  liability	  for	  hyperlinking.	  Additional	   insight	   on	   liability	   for	   hyperlinking	   in	   Canada	   comes	   from	   the	  
Crookes	   case	   regarding	   defamation.	   While	   the	   question	   in	   that	   case	   –	   whether	  hyperlinking	  constitutes	  publication	  –	  was	  slightly	  different,	   the	  guiding	  principles	  are	   similar.	   Justice	   Abella	   wrote	   for	   the	   majority	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   that	  hyperlinking,	  by	  itself,	  will	  not	  constitute	  publication	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  defamation.	  In	   refusing	   to	   impose	   liability	   for	   defamation	   through	   hyperlinking,	   Justice	  Abella	   cited	   with	   approval	   one	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   of	   Canada’s	   seminal	   digital	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  <http://samtrosow.wordpress.com/2012/06/25/once-­‐again-­‐linking-­‐is-­‐not-­‐unauthorized-­‐copying/>;	  Sam	  Trosow,	  Scott	  Armstrong	  &	  Brett	  Harasym,	  “Objections	  to	  the	  Proposed	  Access	  Copyright	  Post-­‐	  Secondary	  Tariff	  and	  its	  Progeny	  Licenses:	  A	  Working	  Paper”	  (14	  August	  2012),	  online:	  FIMS	  Library	  and	  Information	  Science	  Publications	  <http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1026&context=fimspub>.	  33	  Warman	  v	  Fournier,	  2012	  FC	  803,	  104	  CPR	  (4th)	  21.	  34	  Ibid	  at	  para	  38.	  
Transatlantic	  Copyright	  Comparisons	  
	   15	  
copyright	  cases,	  SOCAN	  v.	  CAIP.35	  Interestingly,	   the	  SOCAN	  v.	  CAIP	  decision	   in	  2004	  stemmed	  from	  the	  same	  tariff	  proceedings	  that	  also	  led	  to	  the	  ESA	  decision	  in	  2012.	  In	   the	   2004	   case,	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   decided	   that	   merely	   providing	   Internet	  connectivity	   or	   hosting	   copyright-­‐infringing	   content	   did	   not	   create	   liability	   for	  communicating	   that	   content	   to	   the	   public	   by	   telecommunication.	   Analogously,	  “subordinate	  distributors”36	  who	  provide	  hyperlinks	  do	  not	  publish	  the	  content	  they	  link	  to.	  Will	  the	  same	  principle	  be	  extended	  to	  hyperlinking,	  or	  could	  linkers	  be	  held	  liable	   for	   communication	   merely	   by	   making	   available,	   or	   making	   more	   widely	  available,	  hyperlinked	  content?	  Paragraph	   2.4(1)(b)	   of	   Canada’s	   Copyright	   Act	   states	   that	   only	   providing	  “providing	   the	   means	   of	   telecommunication	   necessary	   for	   another	   person	   to	   so	  communicate”	  is	  not	  itself	  a	  communication.	  While,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  hinted	  in	  its	  2004	   decision	   that	   “embedded	   links	   which	   automatically	   precipitate	   a	  telecommunication”37	  might	   lead	   to	   liability,	   it	   also	   held	   that	   caching	   content	  was	  not	  communication,	  but	  merely	  part	  of	  the	  means	  necessary	  to	  provide	  “faster	  and	  more	  economic	  service.”38	  Granted,	   caching	  was	  perceived	   to	  be	   “content	  neutral;”	  hyperlinking	  may	  not	  be	  so.	  However,	  if	  caching	  does	  not	  trigger	  liability,	  how	  could	  a	   court	   hold	   that	   hyperlinking,	   which	   is	   even	   more	   integral	   to	   the	   Internet’s	  functionality,	  constitutes	  copyright	  infringement?	  
Crookes	  v.	  Newton	  provides	   some	   indication	   of	   the	  way	   the	   Supreme	  Court	  may	   decide	   this	   issue:	   “Communicating	   something	   is	   very	   different	   from	   merely	  communicating	   that	   something	  exists	  or	  where	   it	   exists.”39	  Justice	  Abella’s	   reasons	  for	   differentiating	   hyperlinking	   from	   communicating	   (and	   publishing)	   centre	   on	  several	   crucial	   concepts,	   including	   especially	   “control	   over	   the	   content.”	   She	  characterized	  the	  participation	  of	  the	  hyperlinker	  as	  “merely	  ancillary	  to	  that	  of	  the	  original	   publisher.”	   All	   of	   these	   comments	   about	   linking	   to	   already-­‐published	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Society	  of	  Composers,	  Authors	  and	  Music	  Publishers	  of	  Canada	  v	  Canadian	  Association	  of	  Internet	  
Providers,	  2004	  SCC	  45,	  [2004]	  2	  SCR	  427.	  36	  Crookes,	  supra	  note	  25	  at	  para	  20.	  37	  SOCAN	  v	  CAIP,	  supra	  note	  35	  at	  para	  102.	  38	  Ibid	  at	  para	  116.	  39	  Ibid	  at	  para	  26.	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defamatory	   content	   apply	   equally	   to	   linking	   to	   already-­‐available	   copyright-­‐infringing	  materials.	  Furthermore,	   the	   policy	   arguments	   that	   swayed	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   are	  equally	   forceful	   in	   both	   defamation	   and	   copyright	   contexts:	   “Given	   the	   core	  significance	  of	  the	  role	  of	  hyperlinking	  to	  the	  Internet,	  we	  risk	  impairing	  its	  whole	  functioning.”40	  Justice	  Abella	  wisely	  noted	  that	  the	  Internet	  cannot	  provide	  access	  to	  information	   without	   hyperlinks;	   it	   cannot	   work.	   More	   bluntly,	   she	   worried	   that	  liability	   for	   hyperlinking	   would	   break	   the	   Internet.	   The	   Supreme	   Court	   ruling,	  avoids	  a	  “potential	  chill”	  that	  could	  be	  “devastating”	  to	  how	  the	  Internet	  functions,	  “seriously	   restricting	   the	   flow	   of	   information	   and,	   as	   a	   result,	   freedom	   of	  expression.”41	  We	  would	   advise	   courts	   considering	   copyright	   liability	   for	   hyperlinking	   to	  follow	  Justice	  Abella’s	  reasoning	  regarding	  the	  Internet’s	  basic	  functionality.	  Just	  as	  linking	  does	  not	  constitute	  publication,	  nor	  is	  it	  a	  communication,	  especially	  in	  light	  of	  paragraph	  2.4(1)(b),	  which	  creates	  a	  safe	  harbour	  for	  providers	  of	  the	  means	  that	  make	   communication	   possible.	   There	   is	   no	   reason	   to	   believe	   that	   the	  implementation	  of	  the	  making	  available	  provisions	  of	  the	  WIPO	  Internet	  Treaties	  in	  subsection	  2.4(1.1)	  requires	  a	  different	  result.	  Whether	   liability	  might	  arise	  under	  other	  aspects	  of	  Canadian	  law,	  such	  the	  authorization	   right,	   or	   other	   newly	   added	   provisions	   designed	   to	   deal	   with	  providers	  of	  peer-­‐to-­‐peer	  file	  sharing	  services,	  indexes	  and	  other	  platforms,	  remains	  an	   open	   question.	   This	   particular	   paper	   only	   compares	   Canadian	   and	   European	  Union	   law	   on	   the	   communication	   right	   and	   its	   incorporation	   of	   the	   concept	   of	  making	  available.	  
Recent	  Developments	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  While	   Canadian	   cases	   addressing	   copyright	   liability	   for	   hyperlinking	  continue	  to	  unfold,	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  (CJEU)	  has	  also	  tried	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Ibid	  at	  para	  36.	  41	  Ibid	  at	  para	  36.	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in	   recent	   practice	   to	   define	   the	   boundaries	   of	   the	   right	   of	   communication	   to	   the	  public.	   In	   the	   following	   section,	   we	   look	   at	   the	   potentially	   path-­‐breaking	   case	   of	  
Svensson,42	  putting	   the	   entire	   development	   of	   the	   EU	   case-­‐law	   on	   the	   topic	   in	  perspective	   and	   sketching	   potentially	   far-­‐reaching	   repercussions	   for	   digital	  copyright	   law,	   the	   conditions	   for	   creativity	   in	   the	   digital	   space	   and	   indeed	   the	  functioning	  of	  the	  Internet	  itself.	  Case	  C-­‐466/12,	  Svensson,	  referred	  to	  the	  CJEU	  for	  a	  preliminary	   ruling	   asked	   one	   key	   question:	   whether	   putting	   a	   hyperlink	   on	   a	  website	   constitutes	   a	   “communication	   to	   the	   public”	   under	   the	   EU’s	   Information	  
Society	  Directive.43	  Nils	   Svensson,	   a	   journalist,	   wrote	   an	   article	   for	   a	   Swedish	   newspaper	   that	  was	  published	   in	  print	  and	  on	   the	  newspaper’s	  website.	  Retriever	  Sverige	  AB,	   the	  defendant	   in	   the	  case,	  offers	  a	  subscription-­‐based	  service,	  whereby	  customers	  can	  access	  newspaper	  articles;	  the	  articles	  are	  however	  not	  available	  on	  the	  Retriever’s	  website	   but	   merely	   linked	   to	   the	   original,	   third-­‐party	   source.44	  Svensson	   sued	  Retriever	  for	  “equitable	  remuneration”,	  arguing	  that	  Retriever	  had	  made	  his	  article	  available	  through	  the	  search	  and	  alert	   functions	  on	  its	  website.	  This,	  he	  maintains,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Nils	  Svensson,	  Sten	  Sjögren,	  Madelaine	  Sahlman,	  Pia	  Gadd	  v	  Retriever	  Sverige	  AB,	  CJEU,	  Case	  C-­‐466/12,	  OJ	  2012	  C	  379/19	  [Svensson].	  43	  The	  actual	  questions	  referred	  in	  Svensson,	  supra	  note	  42,	  are	  the	  following:	  1.	  If	  anyone	  other	  than	  the	  holder	  of	  copyright	  in	  a	  certain	  work	  supplies	  a	  clickable	  link	  to	  the	  work	  on	  his	  website,	  does	  that	  constitute	  communication	  to	  the	  public	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  Article	  3(1)	  of	  Directive	  2001/29/EC	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  22	  May	  2001	  on	  the	  harmonisation	  of	  certain	  aspects	  of	  copyright	  and	  related	  rights	  in	  the	  information	  society?	  2.	  Is	  the	  assessment	  under	  question	  1	  affected	  if	  the	  work	  to	  which	  the	  link	  refers	  is	  on	  a	  website	  on	  the	  Internet	  which	  can	  be	  accessed	  by	  anyone	  without	  restrictions	  or	  if	  access	  is	  restricted	  in	  some	  way?	  3.	  When	  making	  the	  assessment	  under	  question	  1,	  should	  any	  distinction	  be	  drawn	  between	  a	  case	  where	  the	  work,	  after	  the	  user	  has	  clicked	  on	  the	  link,	  is	  shown	  on	  another	  website	  and	  one	  where	  the	  work,	  after	  the	  user	  has	  clicked	  on	  the	  link,	  is	  shown	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  give	  the	  impression	  that	  it	  is	  appearing	  on	  the	  same	  website?	  4.	  Is	  it	  possible	  for	  a	  Member	  State	  to	  give	  wider	  protection	  to	  authors’	  exclusive	  right	  by	  enabling	  ‘communication	  to	  the	  public’	  to	  cover	  a	  greater	  range	  of	  acts	  than	  provided	  for	  in	  Article	  3(1)	  of	  Directive	  2001/29/EC	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  22	  May	  2001	  on	  the	  harmonisation	  of	  certain	  aspects	  of	  copyright	  and	  related	  rights	  in	  the	  information	  society?	  44	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  Retriever’s	  customers	  needed	  to	  log-­‐in	  to	  the	  website.	  Upon	  search,	  customers	  were	  then	  provided	  with	  a	  list	  of	  hyperlinks	  to	  relevant	  articles.	  Clicking	  on	  a	  hyperlink	  opened	  a	  new	  window,	  which	  showed	  the	  article’s	  text	  as	  retrieved	  from	  the	  websites	  of	  third	  parties.	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falls	  within	  the	  copyright	  relevant	  acts	  of	  either	  communication	  to	  the	  public	  or	  the	  public	   performance	   of	   a	   work,	   for	   either	   of	   which	   he	   has	   not	   given	   consent.	  Retriever	   denies	   any	   liability	   to	   pay	   equitable	   remuneration.	   Retriever’s	   basic	  argument	  is	  that	  the	  linking	  mechanisms	  do	  not	  constitute	  copyright-­‐relevant	  acts,	  so	  that	  no	  infringement	  of	  copyright	  law	  occurs.	  	  While	  the	  facts	  may	  appear	  straightforward,	  the	  law	  is	  not.	  The	  CJEU	  has	  so	  far	   not	   squarely	   addressed	   the	   hyperlinking	   question.	   In	   many	   previous	   cases,	   a	  different	  type	  of	  technological	  platform,	  and	  not	  the	  Internet,	  has	  been	  thematized.	  A	  seminal	  case	  in	  the	  jurisprudence	  is	  Case	  C-­‐306/05,	  Sociedad	  General	  de	  Autores	  y	  
Editores	  de	  España	  (SGAE)	  v	  Rafael	  Hoteles	  SA,45	  which	  concerned	  a	  hotel	  that	  made	  broadcasting	   signals	   available	   over	   the	   hotel’s	   closed	   network.	   There,	   the	   CJEU	  adopted	   a	   broad	   interpretation	   of	   “communication	   to	   the	   public”	   under	   the	  
Information	  Society	  Directive.	   It	   argued	   that	   “while	   the	  mere	   provision	   of	   physical	  facilities	  does	  not	  as	  such	  amount	  to	  communication	  […],	  the	  distribution	  of	  a	  signal	  by	  means	  of	   television	  sets	  by	  a	  hotel	   to	  customers	  staying	   in	   its	  rooms,	  whatever	  technique	   is	   used	   to	   transmit	   the	   signal,	   constitutes	   communication	   to	   the	   public	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  Article	  3(1)	  of	  that	  directive”.46	  Further,	  the	  Court	  pointed	  out	  that	   the	   “private	  nature	  of	  hotel	   rooms	  does	  not	  preclude	   the	  communication	  of	  a	  work	   by	   means	   of	   television	   sets	   from	   constituting	   communication	   to	   the	   public	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  Article	  3(1)”.47	  In	  a	  more	  recent	  case	  however,	  SCF	  Consorzio	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Sociedad	  General	  de	  Autores	  y	  Editores	  de	  España	  (SGAE)	  v	  Rafael	  Hoteles	  SA,	  CJEU,	  Case	  C-­‐306/05,	  [2006]	  ECR	  I-­‐11519	  [SGAE].	  46	  Ibid	  at	  para	  47,	  also	  in	  reference	  to	  Recital	  27	  of	  the	  Information	  Society	  Directive,	  supra	  note	  11.	  47	  Ibid	  at	  para	  54.	  Similar	  conclusions	  have	  been	  reached	  in	  other	  cases:	  in	  Organismos	  Sillogikis	  
Diacheirisis	  Dimiourgon	  Theatrikon	  ki	  Optikoakoustikon	  Ergon	  v	  Divani	  Acropolis	  Hotel	  and	  Tourism	  
AE,	  CJEU,	  Case	  C-­‐136/09,	  [2010]	  ECR	  I-­‐37	  [OSDDTOE],	  the	  CJEU	  said	  that	  a	  hotel	  owner	  who	  installs	  TV	  sets	  in	  hotel	  rooms	  that	  are	  connected	  to	  an	  antenna	  undertakes	  an	  act	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public;	  in	  Phonographic	  Performance	  (Ireland)	  v	  Ireland,	  CJEU,	  Case	  162/10,	  [2012]	  ECR	  I-­‐0000	  [Phonographic	  Performance	  (Ireland)],	  the	  same	  applied	  for	  a	  hotel	  operator,	  who	  provided	  televisions	  and	  radios	  to	  which	  it	  distributed	  a	  broadcast	  signal	  or	  other	  apparatus	  and	  phonograms	  in	  physical	  or	  digital	  form,	  which	  may	  be	  played	  on	  or	  heard	  from	  such	  apparatus.	  While	  the	  first	  case	  fell	  under	  the	  Information	  Society	  Directive,	  the	  second	  was	  under	  the	  Rental	  
and	  Lending	  Directive	  2006/115/EC.	  Also,	  in	  Football	  Association	  Premier	  League	  v	  QC	  Leisure	  the	  Court	  held	  that	  the	  transmission	  of	  the	  broadcast	  works	  through	  TV	  screen	  and	  speakers	  to	  the	  customers	  in	  a	  public	  house	  is	  covered	  by	  “communication	  to	  the	  public”	  (Joined	  cases	  Football	  
Association	  Premier	  League	  v	  QC	  Leisure,	  Case	  C-­‐403/08,	  and	  Karen	  Murphy	  v	  Media	  Protection	  
Services,	  Case	  C-­‐429/08,	  [2011]	  ECR	  I-­‐0000	  [Football	  League	  and	  Karen	  Murphy]).	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Fonografici,	   the	   CJEU	   maintained	   that	   the	   free	   of	   charge	   broadcasting	   of	  phonograms	   in	   private	   dental	   practices	   does	   not	   fall	   under	   the	   definition	   of	  “communication	   to	   the	   public”,	   as	   the	   number	   of	   persons	   was	   small,	   the	   music	  played	  was	  not	  part	  of	   the	  dental	  practice,	   the	  patients	  enjoyed	  the	  music	  without	  having	  made	  active	  choice,	  and	  patients	  were	  in	  any	  case	  not	  receptive	  to	  the	  music	  under	  the	  dental	  practice’s	  conditions.48	  Equally	  importantly,	  the	  CJEU	  found	  in	  the	  case	   of	  BSA	   that	   the	   television	   broadcasting	   of	   a	   graphical	   user	   interface	   (GUI)49	  does	  not	   constitute	   communication	   to	   the	  public,	   because	   the	  viewers	  are	  passive	  and	  do	  not	  have	  the	  possibility	  of	  intervening.50	  	  Overall,	   despite	   the	   disparate	   practice	   of	   the	   Court,	   it	   appears	   that	   several	  elements	   must	   be	   present	   to	   establish	   a	   “communication	   to	   the	   public”	   in	  accordance	   to	   Article	   3(1)	   of	   the	   Information	   Society	  Directive,	   which	   is	   as	   noted	  earlier	   an	   almost	   verbatim	   implementation	   of	   Article	   8	   of	   the	  WCT.51	  First,	   there	  must	   be	   a	   “transmission”	   of	   a	   protected	   work,	   although	   this	   transmission	   can	  happen	   irrespective	   of	   the	   technical	   means.52	  This	   has	   been	   made	   clear	   by	   the	  
Information	  Society	  Directive	   itself,	  which	  explicitly	  states	  in	  the	  preamble	  that	  the,	  “…	   right	   [of	   communication	   to	   the	  public]	   should	  be	  understood	   in	   a	   broad	   sense	  covering	   all	   communication	   to	   the	   public	   not	   present	   at	   the	   place	   where	   the	  communication	   originates.	   This	   right	   should	   cover	   any	   such	   transmission	   or	  
retransmission	   of	   a	   work	   to	   the	   public	   by	   wire	   or	   wireless	   means,	   including	  broadcasting.	  This	  right	  should	  not	  cover	  any	  other	  acts”.53	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Società	  Consortile	  Fonografici	  (SCF)	  v	  Marco	  Del	  Corso	  Case,	  C-­‐135/10,	  [2012]	  ECR	  I-­‐0000,	  at	  paras	  90	  et	  seq	  [SCF].	  49	  Graphical	  user	  interface	  (GUI)	  is	  a	  type	  of	  user	  interface	  that	  allows	  users	  to	  interact	  with	  electronic	  devices	  using	  images	  rather	  than	  text	  commands.	  50	  Bezpecnostní	  Softwarová	  Asociace	  v	  Ministerstvo	  Kultury,	  Case	  C-­‐393/09,	  [2010]	  ECR	  I-­‐13971	  [BSA].	  51	  The	  Court	  said	  that	  Article	  3(1)	  “is	  inspired	  by	  Article	  8	  of	  the	  WCT,	  the	  wording	  of	  which	  it	  reproduces	  almost	  verbatim”	  in	  SCF,	  supra	  note	  48	  at	  para	  72.	  The	  Court	  therefore	  considers	  Article	  8	  WCT	  as	  a	  guidance	  to	  defining	  “communication	  to	  the	  public”.	  See	  SGAE,	  supra	  note	  45	  at	  para	  35;	  
Peek	  &	  Cloppenburg	  KG	  v	  Cassina	  SpA,	  Case	  C-­‐456/06,	  [2008]	  ECR	  I-­‐2731,	  at	  para	  31;	  SCF,	  supra	  note	  48	  at	  paras	  51–55.	  52	  Joined	  cases	  Football	  League	  and	  Karen	  Murphy,	  supra	  note	  47	  at	  para	  193.	  53	  Information	  Society	  Directive,	  supra	  note	  11	  at	  Recital	  23	  (emphasis	  added).	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Second,	   the	   communication	   must	   be	   an	   additional	   service	   aiming	   at	   some	  profit	   and	   not	   caught	  merely	   by	   coincidence	   by	   the	   users.54	  Third,	   it	   appears	   the	  courts	   require	   a	   “fairly	   large	   number”55	  of	   potential	   listeners/viewers.	   The	   Court	  has	  recently	  also	  clarified	  that	  a	  one-­‐to-­‐one	  service,	  such	  as	  streaming,	  qualifies	  too,	  as	  it	  does	  not	  prevent	  a	  large	  number	  of	  persons	  having	  access	  to	  the	  same	  work	  at	  the	  same	  time.56	  There	  must	  also	  be	  the	  so-­‐called	  “new	  public”.	  In	  SGAE,	  the	  Court	  referred	  to	  Article	  11bis	  (1)(ii)	  of	  the	  Berne	  Convention	  and	  noted	  that	  the	  transmission	  is	  to	  be	  “made	   to	   a	   public	   different	   from	   the	   public	   at	   which	   the	   original	   act	   of	  communication	   of	   the	   work	   is	   directed,	   that	   is,	   to	   a	   new	   public”.57	  The	   Court	  specified	  further	  in	  the	  Football	  Association	  Premier	  League	  that	  this	  is	  public	  “which	  was	   not	   taken	   into	   account	   by	   the	   authors	   of	   the	   protected	   works	   when	   they	  authorised	  their	  use	  by	  the	  communication	  to	  the	  original	  public”.58	  It	  may	  very	  well	  be	  the	  case	  that	  the	  original	  public	  is	  in	  fact	  broader	  than	  the	  new	  one	  (but	  it	  would	  not	  have	  had	  access	  without	  an	  intervention).	  This	  has	  been	  maintained	  by	  a	  series	  of	  cases.59	  In	   Airfield	   –	   a	   case	   concerning	   satellite	   package	   providers	   –	   the	   Court	  stressed	   that	   “[s]uch	   activity	   […]	   constitutes	   an	   intervention	  without	  which	   those	  subscribers	   would	   not	   be	   able	   to	   enjoy	   the	   works	   broadcast,	   although	   physically	  within	  that	  area.	  Thus,	  those	  persons	  form	  part	  of	  the	  public	  targeted	  by	  the	  satellite	  package	   provider	   itself,	   which,	   by	   its	   intervention	   in	   the	   course	   of	   the	   satellite	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Although	  “a	  profit-­‐making	  nature	  does	  not	  determine	  conclusively	  whether	  a	  retransmission	  [...]	  is	  to	  be	  categorised	  as	  a	  ‘communication’	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  Article	  3(1)	  of	  Directive	  2001/29”,	  nor	  is	  the	  competitive	  relationship	  between	  the	  organizations,	  excerpted	  from	  ITV	  Broadcasting	  Ltd	  
&	  6	  Ors	  v	  TV	  Catchup,	  Case	  C-­‐607/11,	  	  [2013]	  ECR	  I-­‐0000,	  at	  paras	  43,46	  respectively	  [TV	  Catchup].	  55	  SGAE,	  supra	  note	  45	  at	  paras	  38-­‐39.	  56	  TV	  Catchup,	  supra	  note	  54	  at	  para	  34.	  57	  SGAE,	  supra	  note	  45	  at	  para	  40;	  see	  also	  OSDDTOE,	  supra	  note	  51	  at	  para	  38.	  58	  Football	  Association	  and	  Karen	  Murphy,	  supra	  note	  47	  at	  para	  197;	  referring	  also	  to	  SGAE,	  supra	  note	  49	  at	  paras	  40,	  42,	  and	  OSDDTOE,	  supra	  note	  51	  at	  para	  38.	  59	  SGAE,	  supra	  note	  45	  at	  paras	  41–42;	  Joined	  cases	  Airfield	  and	  Canal	  Digitaal	  v	  Belgische	  Vereniging	  
van	  Auteurs,	  Componisten	  en	  Uitgevers	  CVBA	  (Sabam),	  C-­‐431/09,	  and	  Airfield	  NV	  v	  Agicoa	  Belgium	  
BVBA,	  C-­‐432/09,	  [2011]	  ECR	  I-­‐0000	  [Airfield],	  at	  para	  79;	  Football	  Association	  and	  Karen	  Murphy,	  
supra	  note	  47	  at	  paras	  98–99.	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communication	  in	  question,	  makes	  the	  protected	  works	  accessible	  to	  a	  public	  which	  is	  additional	  to	  the	  public	  targeted	  by	  the	  broadcasting	  organisation	  concerned”.60	  This	  last	  criterion	  seems,	  however,	  to	  depend	  on	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  case,	  as	  the	  most	  recent	  CJEU’s	  judgment	  in	  ITV	  Broadcasting	  Ltd	  &	  6	  Ors	  v	  TV	  Catchup61	  shows.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  CJEU	  stated	  that	  it	  was	  not	  necessary	  to	  examine	  the	  requirement	  of	  “new”	  public.	  While	  the	  Court	   justified	  such	  an	  examination	  in	  older	  cases,	  such	  as	  
SGAE,	  Football	  Association	  and	  Airfield,	  it	  found	  the	  analysis	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  case	  at	  issue.	  The	  CJEU	  stated	  that:	  “In	  those	  cases,	  the	  Court	  examined	  situations	  in	  which	  an	   operator	   had	   made	   accessible,	   by	   its	   deliberate	   intervention,	   a	   broadcast	  containing	   protected	   works	   to	   a	   new	   public	   which	   was	   not	   considered	   by	   the	  authors	  concerned	  when	  they	  authorised	  the	  broadcast	  in	  question”.62	  The	  present	  case	   concerned	   however	   the	   transmission	   of	   works	   included	   in	   a	   terrestrial	  broadcast	   and	   the	   making	   available	   of	   those	   works	   over	   the	   Internet.	   The	   CJEU	  found	   that	   “each	   of	   those	   two	   transmissions	  must	   be	   authorised	   individually	   and	  separately	   by	   the	   authors	   concerned	   given	   that	   each	   is	   made	   under	   specific	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  Airfield,	  ibid.,	  at	  para	  79.	  The	  case	  was	  under	  the	  decided	  under	  Satellite	  and	  Cable	  Directive	  (Council	  Directive	  93/83/EEC	  of	  27	  September	  1993	  on	  the	  coordination	  of	  certain	  rules	  concerning	  copyright	  and	  rights	  related	  to	  copyright	  applicable	  to	  satellite	  broadcasting	  and	  cable	  retransmission	  (OJ	  1993	  L	  248,	  p.	  15).	  It	  concerned	  situations	  where	  the	  supplier	  of	  a	  digital	  satellite	  television	  service	  does	  not	  transmit	  its	  own	  programme	  but	  either	  receives	  the	  programme-­‐carrying	  signals	  from	  a	  broadcasting	  station	  or	  instructs	  a	  broadcaster	  to	  transmit	  programme-­‐carrying	  signals	  to	  a	  satellite	  from	  which	  they	  are	  beamed	  to	  subscribers	  of	  the	  digital	  television	  services.	  The	  CJEU	  decided	  that	  even	  indirect	  transmission	  requires	  authorization,	  unless	  the	  right	  holders	  have	  agreed	  beforehand	  with	  the	  broadcasting	  organization	  that	  the	  protected	  works	  will	  also	  be	  communicated	  to	  the	  public	  through	  that	  provider,	  and	  when	  the	  provider	  does	  not	  make	  those	  works	  accessible	  to	  a	  new	  public.	  61	  TV	  Catchup,	  supra	  note	  54.	  TV	  Catchup	  (TVC)	  operates	  an	  online	  platform	  that	  retransmits	  intercepted	  terrestrial	  and	  satellite	  TV	  channels,	  enabling	  subscribers	  to	  watch	  “near-­‐live”	  television	  on	  their	  computers,	  tablets,	  mobile	  phones	  and	  other	  devices.	  TVC’s	  service	  is	  funded	  by	  advertising	  before	  the	  live	  stream	  is	  viewed,	  as	  well	  as	  by	  “in-­‐skin	  advertising”.	  Several	  UK	  commercial	  broadcasters	  (including	  ITV,	  Channel	  4	  and	  Channel	  5)	  brought	  proceedings	  before	  the	  English	  High	  Court	  contending	  that	  the	  streaming	  of	  their	  broadcasts	  is	  an	  unauthorised	  “communication	  to	  the	  public”.	  The	  English	  Court	  took	  the	  view	  that	  it	  was	  not	  clear	  from	  previous	  CJEU	  case	  law	  that	  there	  was	  a	  “communication	  to	  the	  public”	  under	  circumstances	  such	  as	  this	  where	  works	  are	  streamed	  to	  subscribers	  who	  are	  already	  entitled	  to	  access	  the	  original	  broadcast	  signals	  via	  TVs	  in	  their	  own	  homes,	  and	  referred	  this	  question	  to	  the	  CJEU.	  The	  English	  Court	  also	  asked	  whether	  it	  made	  a	  difference	  to	  the	  CJEU’s	  response	  if	  subscribers	  were	  only	  allowed	  a	  one-­‐to-­‐one	  connection	  to	  TVC	  server,	  and	  whether	  the	  fact	  that	  TVC	  was	  acting	  in	  direct	  competition	  with	  the	  commercial	  broadcasters,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  viewers	  and	  advertising	  revenues,	  should	  have	  any	  effect	  on	  the	  decision.	  62	  Ibid	  at	  para	  38.	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technical	   conditions,	   using	   a	   different	   means	   of	   transmission	   for	   the	   protected	  works,	   and	   each	   is	   intended	   for	   a	   public”.63	  TV	  Catchup	  was	   a	   swift	   and	   confident	  judgment	  by	  the	  CJEU	  confirming	  the	  rights	  of	  broadcasters	  and	  clearly	  classifying	  online	  streaming	  as	  a	  restricted	  copyright	  category,	  which	  demands	  rightsholders’	  authorization.64	  It	   is	  still	  unclear	  how	  all	   these	  different	  criteria	  relate	   to	  each	  other.65	  Even	  more	  important	  for	  our	  discussion	  is	  the	  question	  of	  how	  the	  test	  would	  be	  applied	  to	   hyperlinking,	   and	   whether	   hyperlinking	   would	   then	   qualify	   as	   the	   copyright-­‐relevant	  act	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public.	  The	  European	  Copyright	  Society	  (ECS),	  which	   brings	   together	   renowned	   scholars	   to	   discuss	   and	   critically	   evaluate	  developments	  in	  EU	  copyright	   in	  seeking	  to	  promote	  the	  public	   interest,	  has	  taken	  the	   opportunity	   of	   Svensson	   to	   advise	   the	   Court	   on	   its	   legal	   classification	   of	  hyperlinking.66	  It	  suggests	   in	  particular,	  based	  on	  the	  existing	  case-­‐law	  (but	  before	  
TV	  Catchup),	   that	   hyperlinking	   should	  not	   be	   qualified	   as	   a	   communication	   to	   the	  public,	  because	  (i)	  there	  is	  no	  transmission	  involved;	  (ii)	  even	  if	  transmission	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  there	  to	  be	  a	  “communication”,	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  copyright	  owner	  apply	  only	   to	  communication	  “of	   the	  work”,	  and	  whatever	  a	  hyperlink	  provides,	   it	   is	  not	  “of	  a	  work”;	  and	  (iii)	  the	  “new	  public”	  requirement	  is	  not	  fulfilled.	  There	   is	   a	   host	   of	   scholarly	   literature,	  which	   also	   strongly	   supports	   such	   a	  position	  –	  based	  on	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  law	  but	  also	  in	  full	  consideration	  of	  the	  absolutely	  vital	  role	  of	  hyperlinks	  to	  the	  architecture	  and	  the	  working	  of	  the	  web.67	  The	   ECS	   also	   makes	   references	   to	   the	   US	   jurisprudence,	   which	   provides	   a	   clear	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  Ibid	  at	  para	  39;	  see	  also	  paras	  24–26.	  64	  Streamlining	  the	  practice	  in	  this	  regard	  after	  a	  somewhat	  different	  opinion	  expressed	  by	  Advocate	  General	  Kokott	  in	  the	  Football	  Association	  case,	  where	  she	  found	  that	  the	  FAPL’s	  copyright	  in	  the	  broadcast	  of	  live	  football	  matches	  have	  been	  exhausted.	  See	  joined	  cases	  Football	  Association	  and	  
Karen	  Murphy,	  supra	  note	  47	  for	  the	  opinion	  of	  AG	  Kokott	  at	  para	  200.	  65	  Annette	  Kur	  and	  Thomas	  Dreier,	  European	  Intellectual	  Property	  Law:	  Text,	  Cases	  and	  Materials	  (Cheltenham,	  UK:	  Edward	  Elgar	  Publishing	  Ltd,	  2013)	  at	  299.	  66	  European	  Copyright	  Society,	  “Opinion	  on	  the	  Reference	  to	  the	  CJEU	  in	  Case	  C-­‐466/12	  Svensson”	  (15	  February	  2013)	  available	  online:	  Social	  Science	  Research	  Network	  <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2220326>	  [ECS,	  “Opinion”].	  67	  See	  e.g.	  Jessica	  Litman,	  Digital	  Copyright	  (Amherst,	  New	  York:	  Prometheus	  Books,	  2001)	  at	  183;	  	  Tanya	  Aplin,	  Copyright	  Law	  in	  the	  Digital	  Society:	  The	  Challenges	  of	  Multimedia	  (Oxford:	  Hart	  Publishing,	  2005)	  at	  151;	  Lionel	  Bently	  and	  Brad	  Sherman,	  Intellectual	  Property	  Law,	  3rd	  ed	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2008)	  at	  151.	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precedent	  with	  regard	  to	  Internet	  links,68	  and	  to	  Canadian	  developments,	  explicitly	  citing	  Justice	  Abella’s	  reasoning	  in	  Crookes	  v.	  Newton.69	  To	   be	   sure,	   the	   decision	   in	   Svensson	   will	   be	   crucial	   in	   clarifying	   the	   EU	  practice	   and	   providing	   legal	   certainty.	   The	   CJEU	   will	   also	   need	   to	   consider	   the	  existing,	   albeit	   scant,	   jurisprudence	   of	   the	  Member	   States.	   In	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	  national	  case-­‐law	  so	  far,	  there	  have	  been	  three	  important	  decisions,	  which	  address	  the	  issue	  of	  hyperlinking	  under	  copyright	  law.	  Two	  of	  the	  judgments	  have	  not	  classified	  hyperlinking	  as	  communication	  to	  the	  public.	  In	  Germany,	  the	  highest	  federal	  court	  (Bundesgerichtshof)	  found	  that	  the	  “paperboy	  search	  engine”,	  which	  searched	  newspaper	  websites	  and	  provided	  search	  results	   including	   hyperlinks	   to	   the	   original	   sources,	   did	   not	   constitute	  communication	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   German	   law	   and	   the	   Information	  Society	  Directive,	  and	  did	  not	   infringe	   copyright.70	  In	   the	   case	  of	  Napster.no,71	  the	   Supreme	  Court	   of	  Norway	  held	  that	  posting	  hyperlinks,	  which	  led	  to	  unlawfully	  uploaded	  MP3	  files	  did	  not	  constitute	  an	  act	  of	  making	  the	  files	  available	  to	  the	  public.	  The	  Court	  dismissed	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  linking	  involved	  an	  independent	  and	  immediate	  access	  to	  the	  music.	   It	   stressed	   in	   addition	   that,	   “[i]t	   cannot	   be	   doubted	   that	   simply	   making	   a	  website	   address	   known	   by	   rendering	   it	   on	   the	   internet	   is	   not	   making	   a	   work	  publicly	   available.	   This	   must	   be	   the	   case	   independent	   of	   whether	   the	   address	  concerns	   lawfully	   or	   unlawfully	   posted	   material”.72	  The	   case	   was	   decided	   on	   the	  basis	  of	  secondary	  liability,	  which	  is	  not	  harmonized	  at	  the	  EU	  level,	  and	  referred	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  ECS,	  “Opinion”,	  supra	  note	  66	  at	  10-­‐11,	  citing	  Perfect	  10	  v	  Google,	  487	  F	  (3d)	  701	  (9th	  Cir	  2007).	  69	  Ibid	  at	  8–9,	  citing	  Crookes,	  supra	  note	  25	  at	  paras	  26,	  30.	  	  	  70	  Ibid	  at	  9-­‐10,	  excerpting	  from	  Paperboy,	  Case	  I	  ZR	  259/00	  (17	  July	  2003),	  [2005]	  ECDR	  (7)	  67,	  77:	  “The	  Information	  Society	  Directive	  […]	  has	  not	  changed	  the	  assessment	  of	  hyperlinks,	  as	  are	  in	  question	  here,	  under	  copyright	  law	  ...	  According	  to	  Art.	  3(1)	  of	  the	  Information	  Society	  Directive	  Member	  States	  are	  obliged	  to	  provide	  authors	  with	  the	  exclusive	  right	  to	  authorise	  or	  prohibit	  any	  communication	  to	  the	  public	  of	  their	  works,	  including	  the	  making	  available	  to	  the	  public	  of	  their	  works	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  members	  of	  the	  public	  may	  access	  them	  from	  a	  place	  and	  a	  time	  individually	  chosen	  by	  them.	  This	  provision	  refers	  to	  the	  use	  of	  works	  in	  their	  communication	  to	  the	  public.	  The	  setting	  of	  hyperlinks	  is	  not	  a	  communication	  in	  this	  sense;	  it	  enables	  neither	  the	  (further)	  keeping	  available	  of	  the	  work	  nor	  the	  on-­‐demand	  transmission	  of	  the	  work	  to	  the	  user”.	  	  71	  Ibid	  at	  10,	  citing	  Tono	  et	  al	  v	  Frank	  Allan	  Bruvik	  d/b/a	  Napster,	  (2006)	  IIC	  120	  (Supreme	  Court	  of	  Norway,	  27	  January	  2005).	  72	  Ibid.	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unlawful	   content	   of	   the	   target	  website,	   as	  well	   as	   to	   the	  knowledge	  of	   the	  person	  posting	  the	  particular	  link,73	  Yet,	   these	   rulings	   do	   not	   match	   a	   recent	   Dutch	   decision	   in	   Sanoma	   and	  
Playboy	  v	  GS	  Media.74	  There,	  the	  Dutch	  District	  Court	  vaguely	  referred	  to	  the	  existing	  EU	   case-­‐law	   on	   communication	   to	   the	   public	   and	   found	   a	   company	   liable	   for	   a	  communication	   to	   the	  public	  when	   that	  company	  put	  a	  hyperlink	  on	   its	  website.75	  The	  Court	   found	  all	   three	  elements	  of	   the	   test	   (which	   it	   itself	  extracted	  somewhat	  flippantly	  from	  the	  CJEU’s	  jurisprudence)	  –	  that	  is,	  an	  intervention,	  a	  (new)	  public,	  and	   the	   intention	   to	  make	  a	  profit	  –	  present.	  With	   regard	   to	   the	   first	  element,	   the	  Court	   stated	   that,	   “the	   placing	   of	   a	   hyperlink	   which	   refers	   to	   a	   location	   on	   the	  internet	  where	  a	  specific	  work	  is	  made	  available	  to	  the	  public	  is,	  in	  principle,	  not	  an	  independent	  act	  of	  publication.	  The	  factual	  making	  available	  to	  the	  public	  occurs	  on	  the	  website	   to	   which	   the	   hyperlink	   refers”.	   Yet,	   in	   that	   specific	   case,	   the	   website	  containing	   the	   photographs	   was	   not	   indexed	   by	   search	   engines,	   and	   the	   Court	  believed	  that	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  see	  the	  pictures,	  users	  would	  have	  to	  type	  in	  the	  specific	  URL,	  so	  that	  without	  the	  additional	  intervention	  of	  hyperlinking,	  the	  public	  would	  not	  have	  had	  access	  to	  the	  photographs.	  The	  Court	  supported	  its	  view	  also	  by	  the	   fact	   that	   the	   defendant’s	   website	   attracted	   substantial	   traffic	   (some	   230,000	  visitors	   a	   day)	   and	   the	   hyperlink	   had	   ensured	   that	   the	   public	   knew	   about	   the	  photographs	  even	  before	  they	  were	  published	  in	  the	  claimant’s	  magazine,	  Playboy.	  The	  Court	   also	   found	   the	   criterion	  of	   “new	  public”	   fulfilled	   as	   initially	  only	   a	   very	  small	   audience	   had	   known	   about	   the	   series	   of	   photographs	   (not	   all	   had	   been	  published)	  and	  the	  placing	  of	  the	  hyperlink	  had	  enabled	  a	  large	  and	  indeterminate	  circle	  of	  people	  to	  know	  about	  the	  series	  of	  photographs	  –	  a	  public	  other	  than	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  See	  also	  similarly	  Amsterdam	  Court	  of	  Appeal,	  15	  June	  2006,	  BREIN	  v.	  Techno	  Design,	  [2006]	  ECDR	  21.	  74	  Stephen	  Vousden,	  “Case	  C-­‐466/12,	  Svensson	  –	  Hyperlinks	  and	  Communicating	  Works	  to	  the	  Public”	  (20	  January	  2013),	  online:	  EU	  Law	  Radar	  <http://eulawradar.com/case-­‐c-­‐46612-­‐svensson-­‐hyperlinks-­‐and-­‐communicating-­‐works-­‐to-­‐the-­‐public/>.	  75	  The	  defendant’s	  website	  had	  a	  hyperlink	  that	  directed	  users	  to	  a	  website	  in	  Australia.	  The	  Australian	  website	  had	  a	  set	  of	  copyright-­‐protected	  photographs	  –	  a	  series	  of	  nudes	  of	  a	  person	  who	  appears	  on	  Dutch	  television.	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one	  which	  the	  copyright	  holder	  had	  in	  mind	  when	  giving	  consent	  for	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  photo	  story.76	  
Svensson	  provides	  the	  first	  opportunity	  for	  the	  CJEU	  to	  address	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  hyperlinking	  constitutes	  communication	  to	  the	  public	  and	  what	  sort	  of	  copyright	   liability	   is	   therewith	   triggered.	   It	  will	   clarify	   the	   scope	  of	  Article	  3(1)	  of	  the	   Information	   Society	   Directive,	   which	   fully	   harmonises	   “communication	   to	   the	  public”	  as	  one	  of	   the	  palette	  of	  economic	  rights	  of	   the	  copyright	  holder,77	  and	  thus	  also	  of	  how	  Article	  8	  WCT	   is	   to	  be	   implemented	  and	   interpreted	  EU-­‐wide.	  The	  EU	  approach	  with	  regard	  to	  digital	  copyright	  cases	  has	  been	  in	  contrast	  to	  Canada	  not	  so	   bold	   and	  more	   incremental	   –	   this	   has	   to	   do	   perhaps	  with	   the	   fact	   that	   not	   all	  elements	  of	  copyright	  has	  been	  harmonized	  at	  the	  EU	  level.	  So,	  for	  instance,	  creating	  hyperlinks	  could	  trigger	  different	  types	  of	  liability,	  such	  as	  (a)	  accessory	  liability,	  in	  particular	  with	   respect	   of	   knowingly	   facilitating	   the	  making	   of	   illegal	   copies;78	  (b)	  unfair	   competition;	   (c)	   moral	   rights	   infringement;	   or	   for	   (d)	   circumvention	   of	  technological	   protection	   measures.	   Yet,	   only	   the	   latter	   has	   been	   the	   subject	   of	  harmonization	  at	  a	  European	  level,	  and	  thus	  falls	  within	  the	  CJEU	  competence.79	  Awaiting	   the	  CJEU	   judgment	   in	  Svensson,	  we	  would	   like	   to	  endorse	   the	  ECS	  opinion	  and	  stress	  yet	  again	  the	  critical	  role	  of	  hyperlinking	  for	  the	  working	  of	  the	  Internet.	   In	   light	   of	   the	   case-­‐law,	   we	   think	   in	   particular	   that	   there	   has	   been	   no	  
transmission,	   which	   is	   clearly	   a	   prerequisite	   for	   the	   communication	   to	   the	   public.	  Much	  more	   in	   the	   line	  of	   the	  German	  Supreme	  Court’s	   reasoning	   in	  Paperboy,	  we	  consider	  the	  hyperlink	  is	  a	  mere	  reference,	  comparable	  to	  quotation,	  in	  particular	  as	  the	   operator	   of	   the	   target	   website	   still	   possesses	   full	   control	   over	   the	   making	  available	  of	  the	  works.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  Vousden,	  supra	  note	  74.	  77	  Ansgar	  Ohly,	  “Economic	  Rights”,	  in	  E.	  Derclaye	  (ed.),	  Research	  Handbook	  on	  the	  Future	  of	  EU	  Copyright,	  Edward	  Elgar	  Publishing,	  Cheltenham	  2009,	  212-­‐241.	  78	  See	  e.g.	  Brein	  v	  Techno	  Design	  [2006]	  ECDR	  21	  (Netherlands);	  Universal	  Music	  v	  Cooper	  [2006]	  FCAFC	  187	  (Full	  Federal	  Court	  of	  Australia);	  Napster.no	  [2005]	  IIC	  120	  (Norway).	  See	  also	  Ohly,	  
ibid.	  79	  ECS,	  “Opinion”,	  supra	  note	  66	  at	  2,	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Comparisons	  and	  Conclusions	  The	   factual	   issues	   in	   Canadian	   and	   European	   cases	   are	   different,	   but	   the	  economic	  considerations	  and	  policy	   implications	  are	   remarkably	  similar.	  While	  an	  important	  goal	  in	  resolving	  copyright	  is	  to	  protect	  rightholders,	  courts	  also	  need	  to	  think	  of	  the	  overall	  sustainability	  of	  the	  digital	  networked	  space	  and	  protect	  broader	  public	   interest.	   An	   interpretation	   and	   application	   of	   the	   European	   Union	   or	  Canadian	  laws	  implementing	  the	  making	  available	  provisions	  of	  the	  WIPO	  Internet	  Treaties	   that	   threatens	   rather	   than	   enhances	   the	   viability	   of	   digital	   distribution	  mechanisms	  would	  be	  problematic.	  Moreover,	  enhancing	  creativity	  no	  longer	  means	  ensuring	  absolute	  authorial	  control	  over	  digital	  content.	  Rather,	  creativity	  increasingly	  requires	  flexible	  systems	  that	   embrace	   the	   new	  modes	   of	   peer	   production	   that	   characterize	   the	   networked	  information	   economy.80	  The	   drafters	   of	   the	  WIPO	   Internet	   Treaties	   discussed	   the	  possibilities	   that	  digital	   technologies	  might	  provide,	   but	   could	  not	  have	  been	   fully	  aware	  of	  all	  the	  deep	  societal	  implications	  of	  the	  Internet.	  For	  that	  very	  reason,	  the	  Treaties	   leave	   room	   for	   purposive	   interpretation,	   flexible	   implementation,	   and	  sensible	  application.	  Andrew	   Christie	   and	   Eloise	   Dias	   observe:	   “by	   leaving	   the	   detail	   of	   the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  WCT	  Article	  8	  right	  to	  national	  regulation,	  member	  states	  did	  not	  realise	  the	  prospect	  of	  achieving	  greater	  uniformity	  of	  copyright	  law,	  but	  rather,	  deferred	   debate	   as	   to	  what	   a	   valid	   interpretation	   should	   entail.”81	  Similarly,	   Ruth	  Okediji	  suggests	  that,	  “far	  from	  harmonizing	  copyright	  law	  with	  respect	  to	  rights	  in	  the	   digital	   arena,	   the	   WCT	   instead	   introduced	   a	   greater	   deference	   to	   national	  copyright	  laws	  that	  the	  Berne	  Convention	  had	  long	  sought	  to	  diminish	  with	  respect	  to	   traditional	   copyright”. 82 	  She	   adds:	   “…	   the	   new	   rights	   were	   in	   some	   ways	  prematurely	  recognized	  given	  the	  lack	  of	  agreement	  among	  states	  as	  to	  the	  specific	  form	   of	   the	   right	   to	   control	   digital	   transmissions	   and	   public	   access	   to	   protected	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  Benkler,	  supra	  note	  5.	  81	  Christie	  &	  Dias,	  "New	  Right",	  supra	  note	  15	  at	  239.	  82	  Okediji,	  supra	  note	  6	  at	  2382.	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works.”83	  As	   others	   have	   argued	   too,	   the	   WIPO	   Internet	   Treaties	   appear	   to	   be	   a	  generation	   of	   international	   norms	   that	   are	   “less	   dependent	   upon	   prior	   national	  experimentation” 84 	  and	   the	   debate	   has	   evolved	   differently	   blurring	   the	   lines	  between	  the	  national	  and	  international	  discourses.85	  Based	   on	   our	   comparative	   jurisprudential	   analysis,	   we	   praise	   the	  preservation	  of	  flexibility	  through	  constructive	  ambiguities	  and	  the	  freedom	  of	  legal	  characterization	  provided	  by	   the	  umbrella	   solution	   reflected	   in	   the	  WIPO	   Internet	  Treaties.	   These	   flexibilities	   and	   freedoms	   now	   enable	   legal	   institutions	   like	   the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada	  and	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  for	  the	  European	  Union	  to	  derive	  technologically	  neutral	  and	  context	  appropriate	  responses	  to	  opportunities	  for	  new	  kinds	  of	  commerce	  and	  creative	  expression	  that	  could	  not	  have	  been	  foreseen	  at	  the	  time	  the	  treaties	  were	  concluded.	  Although	  this	  may	  come	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  certainty	  at	  the	  global	   level	  and	  the	  possibility	  for	  private	  parties	  to	  choose	  legal	  fora,	  this	  still	  reflects	   in	   our	   opinion	   better	   the	   natural	   and	   legitimate	   processes	   of	   intellectual	  property	  lawmaking.86	  Agreements	  on	  intellectual	  property	  protection	  date	  back	  over	  a	  century,	  but	  it	  was	  only	  with	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  World	  Trade	  Organization	  (WTO)	  and	  the	  creation	   of	   the	   TRIPs	   Agreement	   in	   1995	   –	   that	   is,	   comparatively	   recently	   that	  international	   lawmaking	   started	   “to	   replace	   country-­‐based	   assessments	   and	  domestic	   policymaking	   as	   the	   predominant	   mode	   of	   intellectual	   property	  lawmaking”.87	  The	  process	  of	  international	  harmonization	  is,	  however,	  not	  even	  but	  knows	   its	  ups	  and	  downs	  and	  multi-­‐directional	  developments,	  or	  as	  Peter	  Yu	  calls	  them	  “currents	  and	  crosscurrents”.	  “While	  the	  currents	  of	  multilateralism	  push	  for	  uniformity	  and	  increased	  harmonization,	  the	  crosscurrents	  of	  resistance	  .	  .	  .	  protect	  national	   autonomy	   and	   international	   diversity.” 88 	  Rapid	   technological	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  Ibid	  at	  2399.	  84	  Graeme	  B	  Dinwoodie,	  “The	  WIPO	  Copyright	  Treaty:	  A	  Transition	  to	  the	  Future	  of	  International	  Copyright	  Lawmaking?”	  (2007)	  57:4	  Case	  Western	  Reserve	  Law	  Review	  751	  at	  762.	  85	  Ibid.	  86	  Ibid.	  87	  Peter	  K	  Yu,	  “Five	  Disharmonizing	  Trends	  in	  the	  International	  Intellectual	  Property	  Regime”	  in	  Peter	  K	  Yu,	  supra	  note	  13,	  73	  at	  89.	  88	  Ibid	  at	  96.	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developments,	  especially	  those	  related	  to	  the	  Internet	  and	  associated	  with	  complex	  economic,	   social	   and	   cultural	   implications,	   appear	   to	   strongly	   support	   the	   flow	   of	  the	  crosscurrents.	  Our	  Canadian	  and	  European	  Union	  case	  studies	  have	   illustrated	  the	  virtues	  of	  adaptability	  in	  the	  ever-­‐evolving	  digital	  environment.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
